{
  "post": {
    "title": "OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications, mapped to architecture controls",
    "url": "http://bardak.ai/posts/owasp-agentic-top-10",
    "updated": "2026-11-12T07:00:25.168Z"
  },
  "citation": "OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications, mapped to architecture controls, Ivan Bardak, bardak.ai, http://bardak.ai/posts/owasp-agentic-top-10",
  "datasets": [
    {
      "key": "appraising-the-evidence",
      "title": "Appraising the evidence",
      "type": "benchmarkTable",
      "source": "OWASP documents, incident write-ups and vendor reports listed under Sources, read 9 November 2026",
      "caption": "",
      "csv": "http://bardak.ai/data/owasp-agentic-top-10/appraising-the-evidence.csv",
      "header": [
        "Source",
        "Type",
        "What it tells you",
        "Strength",
        "Caveat"
      ],
      "rows": [
        [
          "OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications (Dec 2025)",
          "Expert consensus",
          "Which risks matter and OWASP's mitigations for each",
          "Strong as a checklist",
          "Not a frequency ranking; not revised since"
        ],
        [
          "OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2026",
          "Consensus weighted with incidents",
          "Prompt injection and excessive agency at the model level",
          "Strong",
          "Vote 75%, incident data 25%"
        ],
        [
          "Incident write-ups and CVEs",
          "Single cases",
          "That a risk is real and how it played out",
          "Strong for each case",
          "No public case found for ASI08"
        ],
        [
          "GitGuardian, secrets sprawl 2026",
          "Vendor scan",
          "Secrets left in MCP configuration files",
          "Indicative",
          "Method not stated"
        ],
        [
          "OWASP Agent Control Standard",
          "Draft specification",
          "A runtime gate that checks each agent action",
          "Early",
          "Version 0.1.4; the reference gate fails open by default"
        ]
      ]
    },
    {
      "key": "ten-risks-ten-controls",
      "title": "Ten risks, ten controls",
      "type": "benchmarkTable",
      "source": "OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications (December 2025); incident write-ups and CVE records listed under Sources, read 9 November 2026",
      "caption": "Most incidents fit more than one risk; each is listed once, under the risk it shows best.",
      "csv": "http://bardak.ai/data/owasp-agentic-top-10/ten-risks-ten-controls.csv",
      "header": [
        "Risk",
        "What it looks like",
        "Main control",
        "Where it lives",
        "Public example"
      ],
      "rows": [
        [
          "ASI01 Agent Goal Hijack",
          "Text in an email, page or tool result redirects the agent's plan",
          "Treat all content as untrusted; human approval for goal-changing and high-impact actions",
          "Tool gateway, people",
          "EchoLeak: one crafted email made Microsoft 365 Copilot disclose data (CVE-2025-32711, June 2025)"
        ],
        [
          "ASI02 Tool Misuse and Exploitation",
          "The agent uses a tool it is allowed to use in a harmful way",
          "Per-tool least privilege and a policy gate that validates arguments before the call",
          "Tool gateway",
          "Supabase MCP: a support ticket made an agent read tokens with ordinary SQL tools and write them into the ticket (July 2025)"
        ],
        [
          "ASI03 Identity and Privilege Abuse",
          "Inherited or broad credentials reach far beyond the task",
          "Short-lived, task-scoped tokens and a separate identity per agent",
          "Identity",
          "GitHub MCP: the agent's GitHub access covered the user's private repositories, which a hijacked agent leaked (May 2025)"
        ],
        [
          "ASI04 Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities",
          "A tool, MCP server, prompt or model is malicious or tampered with",
          "Signed, pinned and allow-listed components, re-checked at run time",
          "Supply chain, runtime",
          "postmark-mcp: a fake npm package copied every email to an attacker (September 2025)"
        ],
        [
          "ASI05 Unexpected Code Execution (RCE)",
          "Generated or injected code runs on the host",
          "Sandbox without production access; validation gate between generating and running code",
          "Runtime",
          "Cursor CurXecute: an injection made the agent write an MCP config that ran an attacker command (CVE-2025-54135)"
        ],
        [
          "ASI06 Memory & Context Poisoning",
          "Poisoned memory steers later sessions",
          "Check and attribute every memory write; per-user memory; expire what is unverified",
          "Data and memory",
          "CoSnitch: a web page made Copilot store an attacker instruction in its memory (CVE-2026-24301, August 2026)"
        ],
        [
          "ASI07 Insecure Inter-Agent Communication",
          "Agents trust messages and peers they should not",
          "Mutual authentication, signed messages, no open discovery",
          "Runtime, identity",
          "ServiceNow Now Assist: a hijacked agent recruited a more capable agent by default discovery (November 2025)"
        ],
        [
          "ASI08 Cascading Failures",
          "One fault spreads across agents faster than people can check",
          "Circuit breakers and checkpoints between planning and execution",
          "Runtime",
          "No public incident found"
        ],
        [
          "ASI09 Human-Agent Trust Exploitation",
          "A person approves a harmful action the agent presented well",
          "Approval screens built from facts, not model text; multi-step confirmation",
          "People and process",
          "Lies-in-the-Loop: injected text hid a command above the visible part of an approval prompt (September 2025, a demonstration)"
        ],
        [
          "ASI10 Rogue Agents",
          "An agent keeps acting outside its intended scope",
          "Behaviour baselines, a kill switch and credential revocation",
          "Runtime, operations",
          "No clear public case found; Replit's production database deletion (July 2025) is often cited, but OWASP files it under ASI01 and ASI09"
        ]
      ]
    },
    {
      "key": "in-how-many-of-the-ten-risks-each-control-appears",
      "title": "In how many of the ten risks each control appears",
      "type": "chart",
      "source": "OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications (December 2025), mitigation sections for ASI01 to ASI10",
      "caption": "My count from the mitigation lists in OWASP's document; a different reading moves a bar by one, not the order of the top. Logging limits damage and supports response; it does not prevent anything. A kill switch is named only under ASI04 and ASI10.",
      "csv": "http://bardak.ai/data/owasp-agentic-top-10/in-how-many-of-the-ten-risks-each-control-appears.csv",
      "header": [
        "control",
        "Risks (of 10)"
      ],
      "rows": [
        [
          "Logging, monitoring and drift detection",
          "10"
        ],
        [
          "Human approval for high-impact actions",
          "8"
        ],
        [
          "Signing, pinning and provenance",
          "8"
        ],
        [
          "Least privilege and scoped, short-lived credentials",
          "7"
        ],
        [
          "Policy gate outside the model",
          "7"
        ],
        [
          "Sandbox and egress control",
          "6"
        ]
      ]
    }
  ]
}